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NOTES
federal constitutional questions. While such a decision may be
desirable from the standpoint of uniformity of the law, and while
it may follow logically from statements of the abstention doctrine
found in many of the cases, it is the view of this writer that the
dissent's argument that the civil rights legislation takes this
case out of the general rule has not been met. The dissenting
opinion points out that since the equitable abstention doctrine
arose in the Pullman case, it has been extended so far as to have
become a delaying tactic, both expensive and frustrating. Apart
from regional connotations, there is some merit to the views of
one writer that applying the abstention doctrine in cases like the
instant case "gives utterance to the very legal discord which the
[civil rights] statutes were enacted to silence. '23
David W. Robertson
LABOR LAW - POWER OF THE ARBITRATOR TO AWARD DAMAGES
Plaintiff union brought an action for specific enforcement
of an agreement to arbitrate, which was treated as an action for
a declaratory judgment interpreting a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement with defendant employer calling for arbi-
tration of differences in the interpretation or performance of
the agreement. Defendant had assigned an employee overtime
work which plaintiff contended should have been assigned to
another employee. Plaintiff demanded that the aggrieved em-
ployee receive premium pay for the work unjustly denied him.
Defendant refused to pay him on the ground of a company policy
of "no work-no pay," but did offer to let him work four hours
at his convenience, for which he would receive premium pay.
Plaintiff refused this offer and requested arbitration. Defendant
agreed on condition the arbitration be limited to a determination
of whether there had been a violation of the agreement, without
formulating a remedy. The agreement was silent as to the ar-
bitrator's power to award damages or penalties for misassign-
ment of overtime, although other sections provided for remedies.'
23. See Comment, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 185, 191 (1959).
1. E.g., Section 14 dealing with vacations; Section 15 dealing with pay for
those on jury duty; Section 16 dealing with severance pay; Section 17 dealing
with annuities; Section 18 dealing with funeral leaves. The district court said:
"In these clauses [enumerated above] there is language to be applied for determin-
ing an appropriate remedy, e.g., if there is a dispute as to whether or not a certain
employee qualifies for a vacation without pay, the arbitrator certainly has the right
to order the company to give the employee a two weeks' vacation with pay." Re-
finery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, n. 4 (W.D. La. 1958).
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In the suit for specific enforcement the union requested sum-
mary judgment ordering defendant to arbitrate the grievance
without limiting the power of the arbitrator to provide a remedy
for breach of contract. The district court ordered defendant to
proceed to arbitration, but limited the arbitrator's power to a
determination of whether there had been a violation of the con-
tract.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held,
affirmed.3 A provision in a collective bargaining agreement pro-
viding for arbitration only of differences relating to its interpre-
tation and performance and providing remedies in some sections,
does not give an arbitrator unlimited power to determine a rem-
edy in a section which is silent on that subject. Refinery Em-
ployees v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1959),
certiorari denied, 4 L.Ed.2d 152 (U.S. 1959).
The question of the power of an arbitrator to fashion a rem-
edy where there is no express provision in the agreement appar-
ently had not been passed on in any reported federal court de-
cision prior to the instant case. The few decisions in state courts
have not been consistent. While some state courts have held that
an arbitrator has no power to award damages unless specifically
authorized by the parties, 4 others have recognized power to make
an award of damages, where there was no express authority
given.5 Although there is a dearth of judicial authority on the
subject, an examination of the reported labor arbitration de-
cisions will reveal that the power is well recognized and often
used by arbitrators. In some decisions involving problems sim-
ilar to that in the instant case, i.e., misassignment of overtime,
the award has consisted of allowing the aggrieved employees to
make up the work which they should have been assigned.6 How-
ever, in many cases the arbitrators have awarded the employees
money without any make-up requirement.7 Generally, three rea-
2. Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. La.
1958).
3. Brown, J., dissented. Hutcheson, C.J., wrote a rather caustic concurring
opinion in which he takes the dissenting judge to task for "taking too seriously
his role of leader in our court of an activist movement to deride and destroy the
ancient landmarks of the law." 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 1959).
4. Publishers' Ass'n v. Typographical Union, 168 Misc. 267, 5 N.Y.S.2d 847
(1938) ; Guidry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 320 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ; Lone
Star Cotton Mills v. Thomas, 227 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
5. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Local 405, 140 Conn. 32, 97 A.2d 898 (1953)
Magliozzi v. Handschumacher & Co., 99 N.E.2d 856 (Mass. 1951) ; Application of
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 166 Pa. Super. 91, 70 A.2d 681 (1950).
6. Celanese Corp. of America, 24 Lab. Arb. 168 (1954) ; Bridgeport Brass Co.,
19 Lab. Arb. 690 (1952) (allowed make-up and money damages) ; Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 30 (1946) ; Walworth Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 551 (1946).
7. Mississippi Aluminum Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 625 (1956) ; Goodyear Atomic
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sons have been advanced in support of awarding money dam-
ages. First, it has been said that money awards are necessary
to insure compliance with the contract in the future." These
awards are apparently regarded as penalties for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement.9 It is argued that to hold the
absence of specific provisions for penalties to preclude arbitra-
tors from awarding such penalties would have two detrimental
results, (1) some method other than arbitration would be needed
for a remedy, making arbitration a relatively unimportant pro-
cedure, and (2) agreements would become loaded down with
liquidated damage clauses to allow such penalties.10 Secondly,
some arbitrators have stated that the award actually amounts to
compensatory damages for breach of the contract. It is said to
be misleading to speak of penalties for work not performed be-
cause the real issue is a loss sustained by an employee through
the employer's breach of the agreement.1 The third proposed
basis for power to make awards is simply the inherent power of
the arbitrator.12 The purpose of arbitration, it is contended, 8 is
to settle disputes peacefully in place of strikes and lockouts. The
parties contemplate that the arbitrator will fully settle the dis-
pute by granting adequate relief. It would be futile to restrict the
Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 634 (1956) ; Phillips Chemical Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 721 (1951) ;
International Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 430 (1950) ; Monsanto Chemical Co.,
15 Lab. Arb. 589 (1950); American Machine & Foundry Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 822
(1950) United States Rubber Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 839 (1949) ; Firestone Tire '&
Rubber Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 518 (1948) ; Bethlehem Steel Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 493
(1947); Ingersoll Rand Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 564 (1947); International Harvester
Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894 (1947). But see Textron Inc., 12 Lab. Arb. 475 (1949).
8. American Machine & Foundry Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 822 (1950) ; United States
Rubber Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 839 (1949).
9. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 493 (1947), wherein the arbi-
trator said that the aggrieved employees were entitled to recover from the employer
their fair share of the premium pay, and this was in the nature of a penalty
against the employer because he had promised to divide the work equally and had
not done so.
10. International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894 (1947). See Mississippi
Aluminum Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 625 (1956).
11. In International Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 430 (1950), the arbitrator
said that the company's contention that a money award was in effect a penalty
was without merit because (1) it confused compensatory damages with punitive
damages, and (2) it spoke of paying for work not performed, whereas the issue
was loss sustained by breach of contract. In United States Rubber Co., 13 Lab.
Arb. 839 (1949), the arbitrator said that clearly the employee was entitled to be
made whole for his loss, and that make-up work was not an adequate remedy be-
cause he was entitled to the work when it arose and not at a later time more con-
venient to the employer. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 518 (1948),
the arbitrator said that the employee was ready, willing, and able to work at the
proper time, but through management mistake was prevented from doing so, and
make-up work would not place him in the "status quo."
12. Standard Lime & Cement Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 468 (1956) (dictum) ; Phillips
Chemical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 721 (1951).
13. Phillips Chemical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 721, 722 (1951) : "The purpose of
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arbitrator to finding that the agreement has been violated with-
out the power to redress the injury. Thus it is inherent in the
arbitral process and implied in the arbitration provision that the
arbitrator has power to grant adequate relief.
There is language in the instant case that could possibly be
interpreted as laying down a broad rule that arbitrators have no
power to make an award of damages unless specifically author-
ized by the parties.' 4 However, a close examination of the de-
cision will disclose that it is limited to the narrow issue of
whether the arbitrator had "unlimited power" to make any
award he thought appropriate. The court held that under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement the arbitrator did
not have an unlimited power to make an award of damages. By
its terms the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbi-
tration only of disputes as to its interpretation or performance. 15
In holding that this precluded the arbitrator from making an
award of damages, the court relied on Marchant v. Mead-Morri-
son Mfg. Co.,' 6 a commercial arbitration case. However, an anal-
ogy between commercial and industrial arbitration is of doubt-
ful value because of basic differences in the two processes. 17
Further, there is some question as to the validity of the Marchant
case in the field of commercial arbitration,18 with the weight of
arbitration is to settle disputes justly and fully, as a substitute for strikes and
lockouts. If a grievance has no merit, relief is denied; but if it has merit, adequate
relief should be granted. That is what the parties contemplate. Anything less
than that would not effect justice and would not satisfy the complaining party.
Therefore it is implied in the arbitration section that the Arbitration Board has
power to grant adequate relief. The power merely to decide that the Agreement
has been violated without power to redress the injury, would be futility in the
extreme."
14. 268 F.2d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 1959) : "[T]he federal courts have been fully
aware of the force of the considerations supporting a broad commitment of labor
disputes to arbitration, but have adhered firmly to the principle that remedies
(damages) are not arbitrable unless there is clear contractual authority for their
arbitrability. See especially Local No. 149 of American Federation of Technical
Engineers (A.F.L.) v. General Electric Company, 1 Cir., 1957, 250 F.2d 922, 926,
930." The cited case dealt only with the problem of whether under the contract
the question of job grading of a new employee was arbitrable. Nothing in the case
dealt with any express or implied power of arbitrators to award damages.
15. The arbitration clause was Section 21-1 of the contract, reading as follows:iOnly differences relating to the interpretation or performance of this agreement
which cannot be adjusted by mutual agreement, after processing through the griev-
ance procedure may, upon written notice by one party to the other, not later than
sixty (60) days after the date of the decision of the regional manager of manufac-
turing be submitted to arbitration." Id. at 453, n. 6.
16. 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
17. For a thorough study of the differences between commercial and industrial
arbitration, see Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract,
48 COLUM. L. REV. 829 (1948) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
or Alice Through The Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1952).
18. The case is criticized at length in STrURoES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
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authority seemingly against it.1 9 However, while the value of the
Marchant decision as authority in the instant case may be doubt-
ful, a literal reading of the collective bargaining agreement clear-
ly supports the court's view that the agreement was restricted.
In many places the agreement provided a remedy expressly or
impliedly, but in the provision at issue, relative to misassign-
ment, no remedy was mentioned or implied. Thus the court con-
cluded that the parties did not intend to give the arbitrator
power to fashion a remedy in disputes arising under that section.
It appears to this writer that the instant case will have little
if any effect on the long line of arbitrators' decisions claiming an
inherent or implied power in the arbitrator to make an appro-
priate compensatory award. In rejecting the union's contention
as to the unlimited power of the arbitrator to fashion any rem-
edy he thought appropriate, the court did not hold that an arbi-
trator does not ,have an implied power to fashion an appropriate
compensatory remedy. The agreement in the instant case is fair-
ly subject to the court's interpretation of restricting the arbi-
trator's power. This interpretation leaves open the question of
the power of an arbitrator to fashion a remedy where the parties
have neither expressly granted him such power nor impliedly
kept it from him by specifying remedial power in other situa-
tions. 20
Sidney D. Fazio
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 602-07 (1930). The author of that work suggests that
the case is not in accord with the weight of authority and is based on reasoning
that is not convincing. He suggests the majority of the court may have been pri-
marily concerned with the excessiveness of the award, but concedes that, unfor-
tunately, this reason was not assigned.
19. Colcord v. Fletcher, 50 Maine 398 (1862) ; Pearce v. McIntyre, 29 Mo. 423
(1860) ; Garrow v. Nicolai, 24 Ore. 76, 32 Pac. 1036 (1893) ; Slocum v. Damon,
1 Pin. 520 (Wis. 1845). See Baldwin v. Moses, 66 N.E.2d 24 (Mass. 1946). See
also STURGEs, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDs 255
(1930) : "Have arbitrators power, as of course, that is, without explicit authority
from the parties, to assess money damages upon disputed claims with respect to
which, admittedly, they have authority to determine the right and the liability of
the respective parties? There are few decisions upon which to base an answer to
this question. A majority of the cases and prevailing judicial opinion, however,
support an answer in the affirmative." Cf. RUSSELL, LAW OF ARBITRATION 39
(15th ed. 1952).
20. The instant case might be interpreted as holding that in all collective bar-
gaining agreements where some sections expressly mention a remedy and other
sections do not the arbitrator is always denied the power to make an appropriate
compensatory award in disputes arising under the silent sections. If the practice
of spelling out remedies in some sections and leaving others silent is widespread,
such a holding would be equivalent to denying arbitrators any implied power to
make an appropriate compensatory award. However, it is felt no such broad hold-
ing was handed down in the case. As indicated elsewhere in the Note, the case
turned on the union's insistence on an "unlimited power" of the arbitrator to make
any award he thought appropriate and on the restrictive terms of this particular
agreement.
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